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2024 год Июнь (June;Junio;六月;يونيو)

 

Главная \ English \ What Russia’s momentum in Ukraine means for the war in 2024. Equipment losses in Russia’s war on Ukraine mount.

What Russia’s momentum in Ukraine means for the war in 2024. Equipment losses in Russia’s war on Ukraine mount

Ben Barry
 IISS
 
Russia is gaining momentum in its assault on Ukraine amid stalled Western aid, making the coming months critical to the direction of conflict. In a worst-case scenario, parts of Kyiv’s front line could be at risk of collapse.
Russia’s success in taking the city of Avdiivka, along with its territorial gains since, raises the question of whether the Ukrainian assessment in late 2023 that the war would stalemate in 2024 may have been optimistic.

Moscow’s willingness to take territory in the face of high casualty figures, coupled with a boost in output of artillery shells, is in contrast with a lack of sustained Western supply of artillery ammunition to Kyiv. Those dynamics have created the conditions for the most recent shift in the land-campaign’s momentum as the third year of fighting in Russia’s full-scale invasion sets in.

The new phase comes after a challenging year for both sides in which they struggled to mount successful attacks. Offensive operations achieved limited territorial gains and incurred significant casualties. Russia and Ukraine have both found breaching operations difficult, hindered by well-fortified defensive positions and slowed by artillery fire, land mines and loitering munitions. The struggles have exposed training and leadership deficits which have limited the tactical effectiveness of offensive operations on both sides, while showing skill in orchestrating positional defences.
Russian campaign
The months-long battle for Avdiivka likely sets the tone for Russia’s 2024 ground campaign. For Moscow, winning control of the city is a key piece of the puzzle for its ambition to take control of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and to underpin its illegal, verbal annexation of the territories with actual territorial control. Russia also appears to be undertaking synchronised attacks in northeast Ukraine to support that objective.

Heavy Russian casualties may mean Moscow will not mount a major offensive until after the pro forma, mid-March re-election of President Vladimir Putin. Over the spring and summer, Russia is likely to mount a series of major attacks designed to inflict Ukrainian casualties, push defenders westward and expand its control of occupied territories.
The IISS assesses that Russia can sustain its campaign for some time. Moscow has been able to bring on enough contract soldiers to sustain its force structure and should be able to replenish tank losses on the battlefield for two or more years. It also has put its economy in a war setting, with total military spending now representing one-third of its national budget and reaching about 7.5% of GDP. Supply of artillery ammunition, loitering munitions and ballistic missiles from Iran and North Korea also shifts the balance of firepower against Ukraine. That means that over the coming year Russia will probably be able to generate sufficient missiles and drones to maintain its recent level of pressure on Ukraine’s air defences, attack its defence industry and attempt to erode Ukrainian civilian and military moral.
Ukrainian positioning
On the ground, Ukraine has moved to the strategic defensive with an eye on preserving troop levels. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said at the Munich Security Conference last month that the Avdiivka withdrawal was aimed at preserving soldiers’ lives. Kyiv has indicated it is fortifying defensive lines, which likely drove a decision to also retreat from hard-to-defend villages around Avdiivka that quickly fell to Russian forces.

This defensive focus comes at a time when Ukraine has faced difficult choices absent the Western delivery of advanced weapons that Kyiv asked for to gain a decisive advantage. Those requests included enhanced electronic-warfare capabilities, more surveillance and attack uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs), better mine-breaching tools and F-16 combat aircraft (though training on those is now underway). Until such equipment and more artillery ammunition arrives, though, the dilemma for Ukraine’s army is choosing between a forward-defence posture to keep Russian forces from cities and towns at the cost of higher casualties, or pulling back to conserve troops.
Another manpower consideration for Ukraine is the that the average age of front-line infantry soldiers is widely reported as being around 43 years. Former Ukrainian armed forces command Valerii Zaluzhnyi, before being replaced, had asked Kyiv to mobilise 500,000 more recruits for the army. The request was declined. While it would have been difficult to mobilise such numbers in one wave without damaging the economy, the current way of sustaining troop numbers looks increasingly untenable.

With Ukraine resetting its ground forces in the aftermath of its largely unsuccessful counter-offensive of 2023 and recent Russian advances, the country is doubling down onits deep battle strategy, with UAV attacks as far afield as Moscow, St Petersburg and the Nizhny Novgorod region in central Russia, some 1,000 kilometres from Ukraine.
Reality bites
The coming months are shaping up to be more critical to the direction of conflict than the 2024 stalemate scenario suggested.

Unless the West restores aid to Kyiv to previously provided levels, including sufficient artillery for Ukraine to achieve the superiority it enjoyed at the height of last year’s counter-offensive, Russia will retain the battlefield initiative. That could spell, in the worst-case scenario, a series of tactical defeats for Ukraine that could lead to a collapse of parts of its front line.

For now, US efforts under President Joe Biden to provide Ukraine with another meaningful military-aid package remain blocked by House Republicans. Europe, meanwhile, has not demonstrated the industrial capacity or political will to quickly address Ukraine’s urgent needs, although several military-assistance efforts are in the works. While the United Kingdom has pledged to supply ‘thousands’ of new, long-range attack UAVs, when they may arrive remains uncertain.

As the conflict evolves throughout 2024, a key element could well be a contest between Russian attritional tactics and efforts by Ukraine to gain an asymmetric advantage through advanced Western technology, providing this arrives in sufficient time and volume. If that happens, the war momentum could swing again, benefitting Kyiv. But for now, the land war looks bloody and favours Moscow.
 


Yohann Michel IISS

 
As Russia’s losses in its war on Ukraine continue to grow, the IISS assess how long Moscow can sustain its current rate of equipment attrition.
 
 
Despite intense armoured vehicle losses since Russia launched its unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine about two years ago, there are few signs they will cause an end to the fighting anytime soon. The IISS will publish its assessment of Russian equipment losses on13 February with the release of The Military Balance 2024.The losses are estimated to include more than 3,000 armoured fighting vehicles in the past year alone and close to 8,800 since February 2022.

Russia’s losses over the past 24 months raise a key question: how long can Moscow sustain these equipment-attrition rates?

Russia’s offensive on Avdiivka, which began in autumn 2023, is only one example where the assaulting force has suffered heavy equipment and personnel attrition. Still, Russian troops have been able to make inroads there, aided by an advantage in artillery.
 
Defogging war
 
Tracking the active fleets of main battle tanks (MBTs), armoured personnel carriers (APCs), infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and other equipment for either side in the war in Ukraine is an imprecise science. Unlike the high-profile Black Sea Fleet losses or those Russia’s aerospace forces have suffered, the inventory evolution in the land domain comes with far more variables. Refurbishment and production rates can vary greatly, as can the intensity of losses.

The Military Balance 2024 reflects figures up to November, though the IISS has continued to update its data. The numbers for Ukrainian- and Russian-equipment changes reflect a range of inputs, including visually confirmed losses drawn from a variety of sources, the preponderance of which are based on images from the battlefield, especially those collected by uninhabited aerial vehicles. These inputs generally reflect the impact of tactical skirmishes and understate the scale of losses; they tend not to capture the full scale of long-range engagements and associated destruction of equipment, particularly of weapon systems mostly operating further behind enemy lines than tanks and infantry-fighting vehicles, such as artillery and air defences. quickly withdrew from an area, leaving behind destroyed equipment that would otherwise not have been visible. The IISS cross-referenced indicated losses from imagery with other information sources, including Pentagon data leaked in 2023, open-source trackers, including Oryx, interviews and other reports.

Not all the images of equipment hit in combat equate to a system being destroyed, of course. Our calculation also reflects an estimate of what damaged and abandoned equipment was restored to service and what portion was taken off the battlefield for good. In other instances, inventory adjustments reflect equipment captured. For instance, Ukraine now operates a meaningful number of the armoured vehicles it captured from Russian forces.
 
Ukrainian inventory
 
The situation for Ukraine’s land force-equipment evolution is also opaque, in some cases even more so because open-source imagery of battlefield losses is skewed on the Russian side. A detailed recording of available information on losses as well as on new equipment deliveries from Western supporters of Kyiv, supports our judgment of Ukraine’s current inventory. In some cases where information on vehicles has not been available for months, we opted not to include detailed numbers because of the uncertainty over their operational status.

Overall, we estimate that two years after the full-scale invasion, the number of MBTs in service in the Ukrainian armed forces remains near pre-war levels, while the number of APCs and IFVs has increased thanks to Western support. However, Ukrainian efforts to field additional combat elements have outpaced equipment supply, leaving some units lacking equipment to be even close to full strength.
 
 
Bottom line
 
Despite losing hundreds of armoured vehicles and artillery pieces per month on average, Russia has been able to keep its active inventory numbers stable. For 2023, we estimate that Russia was able to reactivate at least 1,180 to 1,280 MBTs and around 2,470 IFVs and APCs from storage. On top of that, Moscow was able to manufacture new tanks and other armoured vehicles, though precise numbers are difficult to glean even from satellite images.

Commercial overhead imagery does shed light, though, on Russian equipment in storage that is potentially available for activation or refurbishment to compensate for further battlefield losses. Russia has 10 Central Tank Reserve Bases, at least 37 mixed equipment- and armaments-storage bases, and at least 12 artillery-storage bases. An in-depth assessment by the IISS last year showed equipment replenishments were roughly keeping pace with battlefield attrition.

It is our assessment, therefore, that Russia will be able to sustain its assault on Ukraine
at current attrition rates for another 2–3 years, and maybe even longer.
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Фото дня 02

 

Олимпийский огонь.

В Парижской мэрии приняли носительницу олимпийского огня

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Всё что связано с интеллектом )

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Новая информация за последний период
 

Элита, контрэлита, антиэлита современной России


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Вагнер. Существование компании и проблемы бойцов

 

паситель мира" в 1958 году, когда его продали на аукционе Sotheby’s стоил смешные £45.
 

Как хорошо мы плохо жили...И про ежика с дырочкой в правом боку ребенку больше петь нельзя.

 

 

 

 

 

 


 


 

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