For most of 2023, a polarising internal political crisis has paralysed Israel and put the very identity of the country at stake. Then, on 7 October 2023, on almost the exact 50th anniversary of the attack that started the Yom Kippur War, Hamas launched an audacious assault into south Israel. The Israeli political establishment, military leadership and intelligence services having been consumed by domestic disarray and internal struggles and diverted to other tasks, were apparently caught again by surprise.
Ukraine’s audacious pre-dawn cruise-missile strikes on Sevastopol on 13 September did more than severely damage a Russian Black Sea Fleet Improved Kilo-class submarine and a Ropucha-class amphibious landing ship and potentially put out of commission an important dry-dock complex. They reinforced a sense of the rising naval stakes in the war in Ukraine and undermined the narrative that Russia still holds a strategic advantage in those waters.
The Wagner rebellion has exposed some of the systemic weaknesses in the Kremlin’s crisis management strategy. Although the aftermath remains unclear, Yevgeny Prigozhin’s actions may have set a chain of events in motion.
The crisis – spurred by Russia’s failures in its war against Ukraine and by Putin’s extraordinary misreading of domestic realities – has sown profound uncertainty and anxiety within the Russian system.
The revolt by Wagner Group forces led by Evgeny Prigozhin on 23–24 June was a tectonic moment in Russian politics. New details continue to emerge and the aftershocks will shape Russia’s – and perhaps Belarus’s – political landscape. But six lessons are already clear.
The value of capturing a Leopard 2A6 remains questionable, as while it could potentially allow the Russian Military to better develop means of countering the vehicles, the repeatedly demonstrated limitations of the German design mean Russia can likely be confident that its existing assets are more than able to neutralise it.
Analysis of Beijing's relationship with Moscow tends to focus on official statements and diplomatic behaviour. But what do Chinese experts have to say about the matter? And how might they be advising their government?
The MiG-31K and Kinzhal’s capabilities allowed them to effectively ‘kick down the door’ to ensure a higher success rate for other kinds of missiles. This leaves Russia with much more freedom to pursue further destruction of critical infrastructure in Kiev, as it has done in other Ukrainian cities, which placed a much greater burden on Ukraine’s Western supporters and raises the risk that major cities could be left unliveable and need to be abandoned. Destruction of the Patriot system also comes as Ukraine’s other air defence assets have become critically depleted, which has allowed the Russian Air Force to play a growing role in the war effort.
The Titanic was on its maiden voyage from Southampton, England, to New York when it hit an iceberg off Newfoundland in the North Atlantic on April 15, 1912. The luxury ocean liner sank within hours, killing about 1,500 people.
This, experts said, is really the biggest question about the counteroffensive. Everyone knows it will happen, and most experts I spoke to were naturally reluctant to make predictions, but the general consensus seems to be that yes, Ukraine will have some degree of success in taking back some territory — just the scope and scale and pace are impossible to say. A lot is going to depend on how success is defined: by Ukraine, by the West, and by Russia, too.
As preconditions for approving some of the transactions, the people said, officials at the State Administration for Market Regulation, China’s antitrust regulator known as SAMR, have asked companies to make available in China products they sell in other countries—an attempt to counter the U.S.’s increased export controls targeting China.
Depending on your point of view, Mr. Prigozhin could be considered either the person of the year or the villain of the year. Mr. Putin is, according to many sources in Moscow, confident that he can weaken Mr. Prigozhin, who has clashed with the military’s general staff. However, the effect could be the opposite, with more people seeing Mr. Prigozhin as the most probable favorite to succeed Mr. Putin.
Why Russia did not prevail—why it was instead stopped in its tracks, routed outside major cities, and put on the defensive—has become one of the most important questions in both U.S. foreign policy and international security more broadly. The answer has many components.
